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Abstract: A comparison of European Union (EU) and
Chinese competition laws that apply to technology contracts
indicates that China's laws are more protective of the
recipient of the technology in several important aspects. In
this context, technology transfer refers to access given by the
owner of technology embodied in intellectual property
rights, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, to a
third party. This transfer usually occurs in the form of a
licensing agreement, in which the owner of the technology
licenses or authorizes the licensee to use the proprietary
technology in exchange for a payment of royalties. Since
advanced technology is an essential component in modern
international business and trade, and since the ownership of
intellectual property rights creates monopoly rights in the
owner, the licensing of such rights by the owner gives rise to
potential for abuses in the licensing agreement that might
impose onerous burdens on the licensee. Technology transfer
laws are a set of competition laws designed to allow the
owner of the technology to reap a fair return for providing
access to the technology, but are also designed at the same
time to protect the licensee from exploitation by the licensor.
This article indicates that China's laws are more protective of
the licensee, usually a Chinese business entity, than
comparable laws in the EU. These protective features can
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place the licensor, usually a multinational company (MNC),
at risk. This article then draws some general conclusions
about China's attitudes toward technology licensing in
general to provide some guidelines for U.S. companies that
seek to invest in China and to license their technologies to
business entities in China.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most important concerns of U.S.-based MNCs doing
business abroad are laws concerning technology transfer. As further
explained below, technology transfer refers to the granting of access
by an owner of technology or information usually protected by
statutory intellectual property rights to a separate party." Technology
transfer has become an essential component in most sophisticated
international business transactions and is closely related to the topic
of protecting intellectual property rights, a core issue in modem
international business.2 Both the European Union (EU) and the
People's Republic of China (PRC or China) have extensive competition
laws concerning technology transfer.3 According to many experts, EU
competition law is the most complex and sophisticated in the world.4
In fact, China has studied and used EU law, rather than U.S. law, as a
model for its competition laws.5 The technology transfer laws in both
the EU and China are important because both the EU and China are
major destinations for U.S. companies that seek to do business
abroad.6 Understanding laws relating to technology transfer in the EU
1 See infra Part II.A.
2See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 324-25 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS].
3 See infra Part III.
4 see CHOw & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BuSINESs TRANSACTIONs, supra note 2, at 314.
5 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 227 (West 2012) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA].
6 The EU is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world. Foreign Direct
Investment, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/eu/globalisation/fdi/index-en.htm (last updated
Mar. 15, 2011). China is the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the
world. UNCATD, Global Investment Trends Monitor No. n, UNCATD (Jan. 23, 2013), at 3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia20l3dlen.pdf.
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and China is essential to any successful strategy for MNCs in the
modern global economy.
This article compares the laws pertaining to technology transfer in
the EU and China and argues that China's laws are, in general, much
more protective of the recipient of the technology (usually a Chinese
business entity) in several crucial respects. As we shall see, China's
laws, unlike EU law, are purposely left broad and subject to expansive
interpretations in several areas. This approach is consistent with
China's approach to law in general, which is to construct laws that
allow the enforcement and implementing authorities to exercise
discretion in how the laws are interpreted and applied.7 From the
perspective of an MNC doing business in China, several important
lessons can be drawn from this analysis. MNCs can be vulnerable in a
number of respects, and can find that their technology might be
compromised under China's laws, unless careful steps in the planning
stages are taken. From a larger perspective, China's laws appear to
still contain protectionist elements that might prove disadvantageous
to MNCs and to China's reputation in general as a place to do
business.8 China justifies its position on the basis that it is still a
developing country that does not trust owners of advanced
technology, often MNCs from advanced industrialized countries.9
Some U.S. companies believe that China's more restrictive laws are
designed to force companies to set up their own operations in China as
opposed to transferring technology to an unaffiliated Chinese entity.o
Part II of this article will examine technology transfer in modern
international business and the concerns that it raises for the owners of
technology, the transferor in a technology transfer arrangement, and
the recipients of technology transfer. Part III will examine the legal
regimes in the EU and in China applicable to technology transfer and
will focus on three crucial aspects in which EU and Chinese laws
differ. In each case, Chinese law seems to be designed to be more
protective of the recipient of the technology than EU law. Although
this article focuses on these three aspects, many more examples exist
that are too numerous to discuss in detail in this study. Part IV draws
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See infi-a Part III.C.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See id.
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some conclusions and provides some suggestions for MNCs to handle
the risks created by China's technology transfer legal regime.
II. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
A. The Importance of Technology Transfer
In the modern global economy, the value of knowledge, business
know-how, and information are more important than ever in
determining success in international business." In the past, an MNC
might count physical assets as its most valuable business aspects, such
as inventory, raw materials, machinery, and other brick and mortar
assets.12 That was in a different era. Today, an MNC considers its
technology-knowledge that is protected by patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and trade secrets-its most important business asset.13
Modern studies show that a product's competitiveness is directly tied
to its level of technology; the more advanced the technology embodied
in the product, the more competitive the product becomes in the
modern world economy.14 A multinational pharmaceutical company,
such as Pfizer, considers its core business assets to be its portfolio of
patents, trademarks, and other intellectual property rights. MNC
pharmaceutical companies earn billions of dollars per year through
the sale of patented drugs and find that these sales plummet as soon
as the patent expires and generic drugs enter the market.s Consumer
products companies, such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's, count their
brands (or trademarks) as their most valuable business assets.16 The
1 see CHOw & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2.
12 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTAL PROPERTY:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 442 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].
13 See id. at 443.
14 DANIEL C.K CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 587 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
15 See, e.g., Caroline Humer, Generics Brought Down Common Drug Prices in 2012,
REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2013, 12:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2o13/o3/o5/us-
expressscripts-prices-idUSBRE92406W20130305-
16 see CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 12, at 443.
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value of the Coca-Cola trademark alone is worth tens of billions of
dollars, at the very least, and possibly much more.17
When MNCs do business abroad, several types of transactions
involve technology transfer. In general, the more sophisticated the
international business transaction, the greater the likelihood that a
form of technology transfer will be involved. Suppose that an MNC
wishes to hire a foreign company to manufacture its products
abroad.'8 For example, the MNC may wish to employ a company in
Germany or China to make its products for the EU and Chinese
markets. Hiring a company to manufacture products locally, called
contract manufacturing, will save the MNC costs in time and shipping
that would be involved if the MNC manufactured all of its products in
the U.S. and then shipped the products by ocean transport to the
target market.19 Contract manufacturing is quite common in
international business and is the exclusive method by which some
MNCs do business abroad.20 In order to allow the contract
manufacturer to successfully manufacture the product, however, the
MNC, as the owner of the technology, must give the contract
manufacturer access to its proprietary technology.21 For example, if
the contract manufacturer is producing a drug or a laundry detergent,
the MNC will need to give the contract manufacturer access to the
technology, usually protected by patents and trade secrets, before the
product can be made according to specifications.
A second type of transaction, also very common in modern
business, involves an MNC setting up its own business entity abroad
17 See id. Coca-Cola's brand (its trademark) was valued at $77.8 billion in 2012, making it
the most valuable brand in the world. See Best Global Brands 2012, INTERBRAND available
at http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/2012/Best-Global-BrandS-2012-
Brand-View.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). This does not mean that Coca-Cola would be
willing to sell their trademark for that amount. Coca-Cola's total annual revenue, based
upon the success of the Coca-Cola trademark and other marks, was $46.5 billion in 2011
(according to their annual review).
18 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at
323.
19 See id.
20 See Steven Van Dusen, The Manufacturing Processes of the Footwear Industry: Nike
Versus the Competition, http://www.unc.edu/-andrewsr/intso92/vandu.html (last visited
Aug. 25, 2013).
21 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at
298.
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rather than hiring a contract manufacturer.22 Many MNCs believe that
setting up their own business entities, either as joint venture partners
with local companies or wholly owned subsidiaries, offers many
advantages to entering into a contract licensing agreement with a
third party. The MNC may not be that familiar with the third party or
may not trust the third party entirely. This type of transaction is
commonly referred to as foreign direct investment (FDI) and is
characterized by the establishment of a business entity in which the
MNC has a lasting ownership and management control.23 Instead of
establishing a new or "greenfield" investment, many MNCs acquire an
existing foreign company through a merger or acquisition.24 Ani
acquisition offers the advantages of immediate market penetration
because the target company will have an existing network of
customers and goodwill and economies of scale that can redound to
the benefit of the MNC at home and abroad created by combining
resources with an existing successful business entity.25 As in the case
of contract manufacturing, however, the foreign business entity, even
if it is a wholly owned subsidiary, newly established or acquired, will
not be able to manufacture the products without the technology
owned by the parent MNC. In other words, the MNC will need to
transfer technology to the foreign business entity in order for it to
operate successfully.26
B. The Process of Technology Transfer
MNCs that engage in technology transfer generally use the
following procedure: the MNC first registers and obtains a patent,
trademark, copyright (or other intellectual property rights) under
national law and then licenses the patent, trademark, copyright, or
other IP right to a licensee in a foreign country in a patent licensing
agreement or a mixed agreement (e.g., patent and trademark).27
Under the principle of territoriality, a patent, trademark, copyright or
22 See id. at 366.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 369-370.
25 Id. at 370.
26 See id. at 495.
27 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 321.
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other intellectual property right creates rights that are effective only
within the territory of the country creating or recognizing the rights.28
For example, an MNC that owns a patent or trademark registered in
the U.S. has a patent or trademark effective only within the U.S. If the
MNC wishes to obtain a patent or trademark right in Germany or
China, the MNC first must separately file and register a patent or
trademark in the foreign country. Each patent or trademark (or other
IP right) is a separate and independent creation of the law of the
country in which the right is registered or recognized.29 The MNC can
then transfer the patent, trademark, or other IP right to the transferee,
either a contract manufacturer or a business entity that is partially or
wholly owned by the MNC.30 The transfer can be in the form of an
assignment or, most commonly, in the form of a license through a
written licensing agreement. 31
Most MNCs follow this procedure in order to establish that the
MNC is the owner of the IP right and that the transferee is a licensee.32
An IP owner never wants to get into a dispute or controversy over who
owns the IP right as this can lead to time-consuming disputes and
needless litigation. Even worse, if the MNC loses the IP right, the
foreign entity might become the owner of the IP right in the foreign
country. Imagine if a German or Chinese company were to become the
legal owner of the Coca-Cola trademark in Germany or China. This
would be a business catastrophe for the MNC.33 If the MNC registers
the patent or trademark in its own name, however, the MNC is the
owner of the IP rights and the licensee only has permission to use the
IP right. If business relations sour or conditions change, the licensing
agreement should have a termination clause that would allow the
28 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at
327.
29 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 320.
30 See id. at 321.
31 An assignment is the transfer of complete ownership rights of the intellectual property by
the owner to the buyer. If the technology is commercially valuable, most owners of the
technology are reluctant to sell the technology, although the owner might be willing to
license it. In a licensing agreement, the licensor remains the owner of the technology. See
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at 324-25.
32 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 321.
33 See id. at 322.
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MNC or licensee to terminate the licensing agreement.34 Once the
agreement is terminated, the MNC remains the owner of the patent,
trademark, copyright, or trade secrets.35
The written licensing agreement is a form of technology transfer
that is subject to regulation in both the EU and China by competition
laws. Note that technology transfer is not regulated by any rules under
the World Trade Organization (WTO).36 Although the WTO regulates
trade in technology under the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the main purpose of TRIPS is to
set forth minimum standards for all important intellectual property
rights (e.g. patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and several
others) and to create enforcement obligations.37 TRIPS does not
regulate technology transfer or licensing agreements, so this field is
left to regional and domestic legislation.38 In other words, there is no
higher forum in which to challenge EU or Chinese competition law
than in the EU or China itself.
34 See id. at 321.
35 See id.
36 See Understanding the WTO, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/what-wedoe.htm (last visited Aug.
25, 2013). The purpose of the WTO is to provide a forum in which WTO members, which
now number 159 states, can lower trade barriers and discuss and resolve trade disputes.
The WTO administers three major trade agreements: the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (trade in goods), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (trade in services),
and the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (trade in technology). See
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 14, at 28.
37 See CHOw & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 14, at 590-91.
38 TRIPS does relate to technology transfer in some indirect ways. For example, Article 31
of TRIPS provides for a compulsory license for a patent, i.e. a license that is imposed upon
the patent owner under certain circumstances. In the WTO, the compulsory licensing
provision has been used to create pressure on pharmaceutical companies to provide access
to medicines protected by patents that would be otherwise too expensive for the countries
that seek the medicines. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at 589-93. This is not the type of technology transfer that is
the main subject of this article, which are voluntary transfers set forth in a written licensing
agreement. TRIPS does not govern these types of agreements. The type of technology
transfers discussed in this article are subject to what are generally considered to be
competition laws, as discussed in further length in the article. Competition law is not the
subject of the WTO (with the minor exception of the Telecoms Agreement, an annex to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, which applies only to some aspects of
telecommunications services and is not relevant to the technology transfer agreements
discussed in this article. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IAW, supra
note 14, at 557.
Technology transfer in the form of licensing agreements is subject
to competition law because many countries are concerned that subject
agreements may lead to anticompetitive effects detrimental to the
local economy.3 9 Intellectual property, such as a patent, creates a
monopoly right in itself, and the licensing of that right to another
might extend that monopoly power of the owner of the patent in a
fashion that creates harmful effects on competitors. A patent owner,
unable to fully exploit the patent in a foreign country, might be able to
exploit the patent by licensing it to a local company in the foreign
country. In the process, however, the patent owner might impose
onerous conditions in the licensing agreement that exploit or
disadvantage the licensee, itself a competitor of the licensor. This type
of concern is of special importance to developing countries, which
might believe that the inexperience of their business entities in
dealing with sophisticated MNCs places them at a significant
disadvantage when negotiating a licensing agreement, and might lead
to their exploitation by the MNC.
These concerns lead some countries to enact laws designed to
protect the transferee or licensee of the technology. This article
focuses on three of the more common concerns. First, the licensor will
license only secondary or outdated technologies while keeping core or
advanced technologies in-house.40 This is a concern for all licensees,
but particularly those in developing countries, such as China. The
licensee is concerned that it is paying for a technology that is not really
valuable because it is not cutting edge or the most advanced
technology available. As we noted earlier, competitiveness in the
modern economy is directly linked to the level of technology, and so
naturally the licensee wants access to the most advanced technology.
On the other side, the MNC and owner of the technology might be
reluctant to part with its most advanced or core technology since it is a
crucial business asset. As in any licensing agreement, the MNC might
be concerned that the technology, once licensed, might be
39 See Part III infra. This section discusses competition law applicable to technology
transfers in the EU, China, and the U.S. However, many other countries have competition
laws that apply to technology transfer; these laws are in most cases domestic laws of a
country, although in the case of the EU, competition law is regional law. There is no true
international treaty that applies technology transfer on par with the WTO treaties on trade
in goods, services, and technology. See note 38 supra. Although there has been some
discussion within the WTO of a general agreement on competition, there does not appear
to be sufficient political will to create such an agreement, given the other priorities of the
WTO.
40 See infra Part III.
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misappropriated or stolen. The higher the level of technology
concerned, the greater the risk, so some MNCs will not license their
most valuable technologies but keep them safely in-house.
Second, the licensor might limit the use of the license by putting in
restrictions as to territory, quantity of products that can be
manufactured, and the sales price of the product.41 For example, the
licensor might restrict the licensee to sales of the product in Germany
or in China, or even in parts of those countries with the idea that the
licensor will either sell directly to other territories or might enter into
separate licensing agreements with other entities for those territories.
The licensor might also limit the amount of products that can be
produced in order to sustain a higher price for the product and
avoiding flooding the market with products. The licensor might also
want to set a price at which the product can be sold in the target
market. All of these types of restrictions are viewed as having
anticompetitive effects.
Third, the licensor will put in so-called grant-back clauses,
providing that the licensor owns any improvements to the technology
made by the licensee.42 In any patent license agreement, the licensee,
in making use of the patent, may discover improvements to the
patent. For example, a licensee of a patent for a laundry detergent
might find that due to differences in the water in China that a change
in the enzyme formula might make the detergent more effective. Since
the technology transfer agreement only covers the basic patent, an
issue arises over who owns the improvement. On the one hand, the
licensor will argue that it owns the improvement, since it owns the
basic technology without which the improvement could not have been
made. On the other hand, the licensee will argue that it owns the
improvement since it actually invented the improvement in the course
of using the patent. The improvement itself might qualify for a
separate patent on its own. As improvements are common in patent
licensing agreements, the licensor might put in a grant-back clause
that requires the licensee to grant all improvements back to the
licensor. Such a grant-back clause would resolve all doubt about who
owns the technology. In addition, the licensor might put in the
agreement a clause that prohibits the licensee from making any
improvements at all, which would also resolve any issues over who
owns the improvement.
41 See id.
42 See id.
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These types of issues arise on a regular basis in technology
licensing agreements and both the EU and China regulate these issues
through competition laws. Of course, there are many other issues that
arise in technology transfer, which are too numerous to examine in
this study, but the treatment of these issues by the EU and China are
representative of how these two jurisdictions handle technology
transfer issues and offer some valuable lessons for MNCs seeking to
do business in the EU and China.
III. EU AND CHINA COMPETITION LAWS THAT APPLY TO TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
Both EU and China have extensive competition law regimes that
are designed to protect the licensee from anticompetitive restrictions
in the technology transfer agreement. The discussion below focuses on
how these laws treat the three major issues set forth in Part II above:
territorial restrictions, grant-back clauses, and level of technology
transferred, but note that both sets of laws are comprehensive and
deal with issues not discussed in this article.
A. Overview ofEU Competition Law
EU competition law stems from Articles lo and 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),43 which is
designed to create a common market among all 27 EU member
states.44 TFEU Article 101, which is analogous to Section 1 of the U.S.
Sherman Act,45 prohibits agreements, decisions by associations, and
concerted practices that have, as their object or effect, the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition that affect trade within
43 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101-
02, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
44 The European Union is an economic, political, and monetary union of 27 states that have
signed important treaties delegating sovereign powers to pan-European institutions. For
the purposes of this article, the most important aspect is the goal of the EU to create a
single market for all 27 states; an important aspect of this goal is to eliminate trade barriers
created by individual nations. Competition law plays a paramount role in achieving this
objective since protectionist trade barriers created by individual EU states are anti-
competitive. For a summary of the EU and its basic pan-European institutions, see CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at 43-45.
45 15 U.S.C. H§ 1-7 (20o6).
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member states.46 TFEU Article 102, which is analogous to Section 2 Of
the U.S. Sherman Act,47 addresses issues of monopolization and abuse
of a dominant position. 48
46 TFEU Article lo provides:
i. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices, which may affect trade
between member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
* Any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
* Any decision or category of decisions by association of
undertakings
* Any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
[Vol. 9:3508
For the purposes of this article, TFEU Article 101 is more pertinent
as it applies to technology licensing agreements, which could qualify
as agreements that have anticompetitive effects within the meaning of
TFEU Article 101.
The structure of TFEU Article lo is as follows: Article 1o(1) sets
forth the general prohibition covering agreements that could have an
anti-competitive object or effect within the common market; Article
101(2) states that such agreements are void; and Article 101(3) states
that the prohibitions set forth in Article 1oi(1) can be declared
inapplicable by the EU Commission, the executive arm of the EU,49 if
certain circumstances are found to exist. If the EU Commission
declares the prohibition in Article 1o(1) to be inapplicable through a
regulation called a "block exemption" then any agreement falling
within the block exemption is permitted.50 In other words, the general
approach of the EU is to set forth a wide prohibition, and then to issue
exemptions to those prohibitions creating a "safe harbor" for
agreements falling within the block exemptions. We will consider a
block exemption applicable to technology transfer agreements in the
discussion below, but there are many such block exemptions, as well
as judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
* Which contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
47 See id.
48 See TFEU supra note 43.
49 The EU Commission, the executive arm of the EU, is charged with administration and
enforcement of EU law. Currently each member state is allocated one commissioner until
2014, when the number of Commissioners will be reduced to two thirds of the number of
member states. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 2, at 44.
5o See id. at 315.
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interpreting both the TFEU and the block exemptions so the
jurisprudence on European competition law is expansive. The ECJ has
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret EU law and the power to require
compliance with EU treaties or EU law by member states.51
B. Overview of Chinese Competition Law
As noted earlier, lawmakers in China studied and borrowed from
EU competition law in creating China's modern competition law. In
part, this is due to China's use of a civil law system, similar to the
system followed in Europe.52 Under a civil law system, the law is
created primarily through statutes,53 as opposed to a common law
system followed by the U.S. in which courts and judicial decisions play
a prominent role in establishing the law. For example, in deciding
whether agreements violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act applying to
agreements with anticompetitive effects, the U.S. applies a "rule of
reason" that is expounded by the courts through written opinions.54
Such an approach would never be practicable in China. Courts do not
enjoy the stature of a co-equal branch of government as they do in the
U.S., but are instead viewed as subordinate to the legislative branch.55
Court decisions are not viewed as authoritative by some
administrative agencies,56 have no precedential value,57 and many
51 See id. at 44.
52 See Heidi Hansen Kalscheur, About "Face": Using Moral Rights to Increase Copyright
Enforcement in China, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 513, 517 (2012).
53 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 2, at
455.
54 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) ("[T]he criteria
to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the
section have been committed is the rule of reason guided by the established law. . . ."); see
also Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (holding
that a restraint on the hours of trade is a reasonable regulation).
55 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 198 (2d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter, CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA]. Another issue with the courts is whether
they are independent of the other organs of government or of the Communist Party. See id.
at 198-202.
s6 See id. at 226-27.
s7 See id. at 214.
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court decisions are never issued in the form of a written opinion.58
Additionally, there is no official reporting system for most judicial
decisions.59 Rather, China has followed the EU approach of setting
forth standards in statutes that are then applied, not by courts, but by
administrative authorities, most notably the powerful Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), which appears to be the final authority on
most issues of competition law in China.60
The primary legislation relating to competition is the Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML), issued in 2007 after more than a decade of
deliberation and effective as of August 1, 2008. AML Article 1 states as
follows:
This Law is formulated to prevent and deter
monopolistic conduct, ensure fair market competition,
increase economic operation efficiency, protect
consumer interests and social public interest, and
facilitate the dynamic development of the socialist
market economy.61
AML Article 3 defines monopolistic conduct to include "monopoly
agreements" and "abuse of a market dominant position."62 These
58 See id. at 215.
59 See id.
60 see MOFCOM (May 22, 2013), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
61 See Anti-Monopoly Law (Adopted at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the
Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on Aug. 30, 2007) Art.
1. [hereinafter AML].
62 Article 3 provides in full as follows:
For purposes of this Law, monopolistic conduct includes:
(i) Conclusion of monopoly agreements by business operators;
(2) Abuse of dominant market position by business operators; and
(3) Concentration of business operators that results in or is likely to
result in any effect of excluding or limiting competition.
Article 3(3) refers to mergers and acquisitions. As a result of Article 3(3), many mergers
and acquisitions need prior approval by MOFCOM. See AML, arts. 20-31. The State
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forms of prohibited conduct appear to be similar to the type of
collusive agreements prohibited under TFEU Article lo(l) and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.63 AML Article 13 specifies in greater
detail what type of agreements are prohibited, including those that fix
prices, limit production quantity, and divide markets.64 Abuse of a
dominant market position, prohibited by AML Article 1 and further
elaborated on in AML Articles 17-20,65 is analogous to TFEU Article
102 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.6 6 Unlike the EU, however,
China does not use a system of block exemptions to create safe
harbors. Rather, China has a patchwork of other laws that apply to
technology transfer agreements, including the Foreign Trade Law,67
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 68  the Regulations on
Administration of Technology Import and Export,69 the Contract
Law70 and other laws and regulations. 71 China also has many local
laws and regulations. Although local laws cannot contradict national
level laws, local laws, regulations, notices and orders are often more
detailed than their national counterparts and so it becomes essential
Council has delegated authority to review mergers and acquisitions to MOFCOM. See
CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 223.
63 See supra Part III.A.
64 See AML, art. 13.
65 See AML, arts. 17-20.
66 See supra Part III.A.
67 See Foreign Trade Law (Adopted at the 7th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Eighth National People's Congress on May 12, 1994, revised at the 8th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress and promulgated by Order
No. 15 of the President of the People's Republic of China on April 6, 2004).
68 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law (Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on September 2, 1993).
69 See Regulations on Administrations of Technology Import and Export (Promulgated by
the State Council on 1o December 2001 and effective as of January 1, 2002).
70 See Contract Law (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's
Congress on March 15, 1999).
71 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 358 (discussing other laws
such as List of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Being Imported, issued by the
Ministry of Commerce and State Economic Trade Commission (2001), and the List of
Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Being Exported, issued by MOFCOM and the
Ministry of Science and Technology (2001).
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for an MNC to understand, not only national, but also local
legislation.72 In addition, China is constantly churning out new laws
and other legal documents at the national and local levels. Any
technology transfer agreement is potentially subject to restrictions
contained in any or all of these laws.
C. A Comparison ofEU-China Competition Laws Applicable to
Territorial Restrictions, Grant-Back Clauses, and Level of Technology
Transferred
1. EU Regulations Relating to Territorial Restrictions
EC Regulation No. 772/200473 creates a block exemption for
certain categories of technology transfer agreements. As noted earlier,
an agreement falling under a block exemption issued pursuant to
TFEU Article 101(3) is given a safe harbor and is considered to be
exempt from the general prohibition against agreements with
anticompetitive effects set forth in TFEU Article ioi(i). Article 2 of the
EC Regulation No. 772/2004 defines a technology transfer agreement
to include "a patent licensing agreement, a know-how licensing
agreement or software copyright licensing agreement."74 Under
Article 2, a technology transfer agreement also includes a mixed
patent, know-how, and trademark licensing agreement or a mixed
agreement containing provisions related to the sale of productions
provided, that the sale is directly related to the production of the
contracted products. Article 2 provides that, assuming all of the
conditions of the EC Regulation No. 772/2004 are met, the agreement
is exempt from the prohibition against anticompetitive agreements
contained in TFEU Article 101(1).75 Article 3 of the Regulation further
provides that the combined market share of the parties to the
agreement must not exceed certain thresholds: 20 percent on the
affected relevant technology and product market where the parties are
72 See Local Legislation in China, CHINA THROUGH A LENS,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/76344.htm (last visited May 28, 2013) ("Local
legislation is an important aspect of the whole legislative system of the country.").
73 See Commission Regulation 772/2004, on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 (EC).
74 See id. at art. 1.1(b).
75 See id. at art. 2 (Exemption).
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non-competing undertakings, and 30 percent where the parties are
competing undertakings.76
Where the parties are competing undertakings,77 the licensor is
allowed to restrict active or passive sales of the licensee into another
territory reserved by the licensor.78 An "active" sale is one that is
solicited by the licensee through advertising, mailings, or trade
shows.79 A "passive" sale is one that is initiated by the customer who
might, for example, have found the product on the licensee's website
on the Internet, or heard about the product through word of mouth.so
In a non-reciprocal agreement, 8' the licensor is also allowed to restrict
active sales by the licensee to a territory that is reserved exclusively for
another licensee. Where the parties are non-competing undertakings,
the ability of the licensor to impose territorial limitations on sales is
more limited and such limitations are permitted only on passive sales,
not on active sales. 82
This scheme set up by the EU permits a licensor-a multinational
company that licenses its technology to a licensee in the EU in cases of
competing undertakings-to set up separate and exclusive
manufacturing and licensed operations for its licensees in separate
countries of the EU (i.e. a separate licensee and exclusive contract
manufacturer in Germany, France, Luxembourg, Italy, and so forth).
The licensor may also wish to reserve an exclusive territory for itself
and sell directly to that territory. This creates a type of flexibility
attractive to many MNCs: different exclusive licensees in different EU
76 See id. at Article 3.1 & 3.2.
77 The EC Regulation defines "competing undertakings" as those that compete on the
relevant technology market (i.e. license out competing technologies or as those
undertakings that are actual competitors on the product market). See id. at art. i(j).
78 See id. at art. 4.1(c)(iv).
79 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACrIONs, supra note 2, at
338.
8o See id.
81 A non-reciprocal agreement is one in which there is a single license to use of technology
granted by Party A to Party B. A reciprocal agreement would involve a simultaneous license
of a second technology by Party B to Party A. See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, on
the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and
Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 23 (EC).
82 See Commission Regulation 772/2004, supra note 74, at Article 4.2(b)(i)(ii).
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countries, each with an expertise in the local language, industry
customs, and with access to local customer lists.
2. China Law on Territorial Restrictions in Technology Licensing
Agreements
As noted earlier, China does not issue block exemptions to
prohibitions contained in the AML and other laws. AML Article 13
prohibits agreements that "[d]ivide sales markets."83 This could be
interpreted to prohibit territory restrictions since these restrictions
can be interpreted to divide or create different markets. AML Article
15 provides for an exception to the prohibitions contained in AML
Article 13 if the restrictions create benefits that override the
anticompetitive effects of the prohibitions. 84 However, while Article 15
8 3 See AML art. 13.
84 AML Article 15 provides:
If business operators are able to prove that the agreements concluded
fall under any of the following circumstances, Articles 13 and 14 of this
Law shall not apply:
(i) To improve technologies or research and develop new
products;
(2) To enhance product quality, decrease cost, increase
efficiency, unify product specification, standard, or implement
division of work based on specialization;
(3) To increase operational efficiency of medium and small
operators and enhance their competitiveness;
(4) To save energy, protect environment, assist in disaster
relief work, or realize other social public interest;
(5) To relieve severe decrease of sales or apparent
overproduction during times of economic depression;
(6) To protect legitimate interests in foreign trade and foreign
economic cooperation; and
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creates exceptions to Article 13, Article 15 does not operate as a block
exemption, which automatically creates a safe harbor. Rather, AML
Article 15 requires that the licensor must "prove that the agreements
falling under Articles 13 and 14" meet the exceptions contained in
Article 15. Proof of an exception under AML Article 15 requires
convincing the Ministry of Commerce, which has been delegated the
authority to implement and enforce the AML. 8 5 In addition, Article
29(7) of the PRC Regulations on Administrations of Technology
Import and Export (2002) (Regulations on Technology Import and
Export) prohibits clauses that "unreasonably restrict the export
channels of the products manufactured by the transferee with the
imported technology."86 The regulations do not further define what
constitutes "unreasonable restrictions," leaving it up to the
enforcement authorities to interpret this standard. MOFCOM is the
enforcement authority of these regulations, in addition to being the
enforcement authority of the AML. 87
These provisions raise concerns for MNCs that territorial
restrictions might not be permitted in China, allowing a licensor or
owner of technology to create exclusive territories for its licensee, such
as a licensee and contract manufacturer for China, a separate licensee
and manufacturer for Taiwan, a licensee and manufacturer for
Vietnam, and so forth. The licensee in China might be permitted by
Chinese government authorities to freely export to all of these other
(7) Other circumstances specified by the law or the State
Council.
With regard to circumstances in Items (1) to (5) of the preceding
paragraph, if Articles 13 and 14 of this Law are not applicable thereto,
business operators shall also prove that the agreements concluded
would not severely limit competition in the relevant market and may
enable consumers to share the interests resulted therefrom.
8s See CHOW & HAN, DOING BusINEss IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 223.
86 See Regulations on Administrations of Technology Import and Export (Promulgated by
the State Council on lo December 2001 and effective as of January 1, 2002) art. 29(7).
87 MOFCOM also approves all business entities set up by MNCs in China. These entities are
called foreign-invested enterprises, and include joint ventures and wholly foreign owned
enterprises. See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 95 (MOFCOM
approval of joint ventures) & 138 (MOFCOM approval of wholly foreign owned
enterprises). Most MNCs find that obtaining approvals from MOFCOM (or its lower levels)
are indispensable to doing business in China.
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countries, undermining the attractiveness of a licensing operation in
those other countries because many licensees want exclusive
territorial markets.
While the AML and the Import and Export Regulations provide for
the possibility that territorial restrictions will be struck down, these
laws also permit the possibility that the enforcement authorities will
permit such restrictions. Licensors need only convince the authorities
of the benefits and reasonableness of the restrictions. Of course,
obtaining these interpretations requires making contact with the
enforcement authorities and opens up the possibility that the
authorities will make direct or indirect demands for a quid pro quo-
permission in exchange for a payment of money, gifts, travel, or other
benefits. These types of exchanges could violate both the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and a number of civil and criminal laws in China
covering illegal bribes.8 8
3. Grant-Back Clauses
a. EU Law on Grant-Back Clauses
Many licensors in patent licensing contracts include grant-back
clauses that provide that any improvements made to the patented
technology by the licensee belong to the licensor. 89 As noted earlier,
the purposes of grant-back clauses are to avoid confusion and create
clear rights on who owns the improvements. Many licensors include a
grant-back clause that requires the licensee to assign any
improvements to the licensor so the licensor owns the improvement.
In determining whether grant-backs of improvements are
permitted, EC Regulation No. 772/2004, the block exemption for
technology transfer agreements discussed in Part III.C.1 above,
distinguishes between grant-backs of "non-severable" improvements
and "severable" improvements.90
88 For a discussion of the issues arising under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in China,
see Daniel Chow, China under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV 574,
(2012). For a discussion of issues arising under Chinese law applicable to bribery, see
Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China's Anti-Bribery Laws and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, (2012).
89 For an example of a standard grant-back clause, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACrIONS, supra note 2, at 344.
90 Commission Regulation 772/2004, supra note 72, at Article 1.1(n).
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Severable improvements are improvements that can be used
without using the original licensed patent; non-severable
improvements cannot be used without using the original patent. If the
licensee, as the inventor of the non-severable improvement, can
obtain a patent for the improvement, the licensee, as the owner of the
new patent for the non-severable improvement, can prevent the
licensor, the owner of the original patent that is the subject of the
licensing agreement, from using the patent in the country where the
licensing occurs. This is possible because the licensor only owns the
original patent that was the subject of the original licensing
agreement. The licensor cannot now use the original patent without
infringing the new patent for the non-severable improvement later
obtained by the licensee.
The EU block exemption for technology transfer agreements
prohibits clauses that require the licensee to assign severable
improvements to the licensor, which means that the licensee owns the
severable improvement. 91 The EU block exemption allows the patent
owner to require the grant-back of non-severable improvements to the
licensor or owner of the original technology, i.e. improvements that
cannot be used without infringing the original patent subject of the
license agreement. 9 2
b. China Law on Grant-Back Clauses and Improvements
The AML is silent on the issue of grant-back clauses. To determine
the validity of such clauses, we need to begin with Section III
Technology Transfer Contracts of the PRC Contract Law (1999).
Article 354 of the Contract Law provides that parties to a technology
transfer contract may agree upon how to share improvements. 93 In
the absence of a clause and if the intent of the parties cannot be
determined by other conduct, the improvement belongs to the party
making the improvement.94 Article 27 of the PRC Regulations on
Administration of Technology Import and Export (2002) (Regulations
on Technology Import and Export) provides that "[d]uring the term of
91 See id. at art. 5.1(b).
92 For a discussion on the consequences of legally required grant-backs of non-severable
improvements, see discussion in Part III.C.3.b.
93 See Contract Law (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's
Congress on March 15, 1999) art. 354.
94 See id.
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validity of a technology import contract, the rights in the
improvements to the technology shall belong to the party making the
improvements."95
The PRC Contract Law, enacted in 1999, is a law of general
application and provides a specific section for technology transfer
contracts. The Regulations on the Administration of Technology
Import and Export, enacted three years later in 2002, applies
specifically technology "import" and "export." A technology import
occurs when a foreign entity, such as a U.S.-based MNC, owns foreign
technology, e.g., a U.S. patent for an invention.96 The MNC then
registers a patent for the same invention in China.97 This is considered
to be an "import" of foreign technology. In a technology transfer
contract, the MNC then licenses the patent registered in China to a
licensee in China. Of the two laws, the Regulations on Technology
Import and Export were enacted later in time than the provisions in
the PRC Contract Law and are specifically tailored to technology
transfer contracts involving imported technology. This would suggest
that Article 27 of the Regulations on Technology Import and Export,
which provides that the improvement belongs to the part making the
improvement, will likely be the controlling law on this issue and that
MOFCOM will be the relevant enforcement authority.
Unlike the EU, China does not distinguish between severable and
non-severable improvements but simply takes the position in Article
27 that all improvements belong to the party making the
improvements,98 which will likely be in most cases the Chinese
licensee of the technology transfer contract. In other words, Chinese
law prohibits grant-back clauses requiring the licensee to transfer any
improvements that it makes to the licensor. If the licensee makes the
improvements, the licensee is the owner. If the licensee makes a non-
severable improvement and then obtains a patent for the
95 See Regulations on Administrations of Technology Import and Export (Promulgated by
the State Council on December 10, 2001 and effective as of January 1, 2002) art. 27.
96 See id. at art. 2.
97 So long as the patent owner registers the patent for the same in China within 12 months
(not counting the U.S. filing date) of the filing date of the patent application in the U.S., the
patent in China will be considered to be "novel" and eligible for patent registration. In fact,
the application in China will be entitled to claim the same filing date in China as the filing
date of the patent application in the U.S. under the principle of "Paris Priority." See Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4 (A)-(C), March 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583.
98 See Regulations on Administrations of Import and Export of Technology art. 27.
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improvement, the licensee might be able to prevent the licensor from
using the original patent in China once the licensing agreement
expires.99 This could create a major business disadvantage for the
licensor in China.
4. EU and China Law Restrictions on Level of Technology Transferred
a. EU Law
The EU contains no explicit laws on the level technology (whether
core or secondary) that the licensor must transfer in the agreement.
EU law also does not contain a requirement that a patent owner must
license its technology, as opposed to keeping it all in-house. In
accordance with the WTO Agreement on TRIPS, however, the EU
recognizes a compulsory license for patents, 00 but the conditions for
granting such a license are difficult to meet. In addition, a compulsory
license is a subject matter that is unrelated to the focus of this article,
which is the voluntary transfer of technology in a written licensing
agreement.
b. China's Laws
Article 55 of the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law provides that "[w]ith
respect to business operators' acts of exercising intellectual property
rights, this law shall .. . apply to business operators' acts of abusing
intellectual property rights to exclude or limit competition."101 An
intellectual property right, such as a patent, confers lawful monopoly
rights on its owner, but Article 55 might be read to consider certain
acts to be an "abuse" if such conduct "excludes" or "limits
competition." One concern is that AML Article 55 can be read to mean
that owners of intellectual property rights registered in China are
99 For a discussion of why the owner of a patent for a non-severable improvement to a
patent can prevent the owner of the original patent from using it, see discussion in Part
III.C-3.
1oo See Commission Regulation 816/2006, on the Compulsory Licensing of Patents
Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to Countries with
Public Health Problems, 20o6 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC).
1o See AML (Adopted at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 2007), art. 55.
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engaging in "abuse" of those rights if they refuse to provide access to
those rights them by licensing their technologies to a licensee. AML
Article 55 might also be interpreted to treat a decision to limit access
to secondary technologies only and a refusal to license core
technologies to constitute an abuse. In other words, AML Article 55
might enable MOFCOM to require MNCs to license technologies that
they would otherwise wish to keep in-house or to require MNCs to
license their core technologies when they would rather license their
secondary technologies.
One context in which MOFCOM exercises a great deal of power
and leverage over MNCs, and in which MOFCOM has already imposed
conditions related to technology transfer, is in the context of
MOFCOM's approval of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in China.
Many MNCs would prefer to acquire an existing Chinese company
rather than set up a new or "greenfield" foreign investment enterprise,
such as a joint venture or wholly foreign owned subsidiary, as a way to
establish a presence in China.10 2 In fact, the acquisition of an existing
company is becoming the most commonplace method by which most
MNCs enter into new markets through foreign direct investment
today.103 M&A in China lags behind M&A in other countries because
China has been concerned about the acquisition of domestic Chinese
companies by MNCs,10 4 but China was aware that it could not simply
ignore M&A, since these transactions are such a major part of how
MNCs invest in foreign countries. When China passed the AML in
2007, the AML contained provisions on M&A based upon years of
deliberation and study of laws in the EU and the U.S.1o5 In future
years, M&A in China is likely to rise in conformity and begin to track
the world pattern.106
Following the approach under the EU merger policy,o7 AML
Article 3 prohibits certain mergers and acquisitions from meeting
102 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 200.
103 See id.
104 See id at 201.
os See AML, arts. 20-31.
1o6 see CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 201.
107 See EU Merger Policy set forth in Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L, 24) 1.
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certain revenue thresholds1os involving business entities in China, if
such M&A transactions could result in concentrations of business
operators that eliminate or restrict competition.109 Such M&A
transactions must first be reported to MOFCOM and must receive
MOFCOM's approval before the transaction can be completed.11o
MOFCOM can approve the M&A transaction,",1 refuse to approve the
M&A transaction,112  or approve the transaction with certain
conditions.113 MOFCOM also has the authority to exercise continuing
supervision and monitoring of the M&A transaction after its
completion in order to ensure that any required conditions are met.114
In the 2009 acquisition of Wyeth, an MNC in the pharmaceuticals
industry, by Pfizer, an MNC also in the pharmaceuticals industry,
Pfizer applied to MOFCOM for approval of the acquisition.115 Both
Pfizer and Wyeth had existing business entities in China that
manufactured human medications and animal products. As China's
108 See AML, art. 21 (requiring notification to MOFCOM if the M&A transaction will result
in meeting certain economic thresholds as set forth by the State Council). The State
Council subsequently issued the Provisions of the State Council on the Thresholds for
Declaring Concentration of Business Operators (2oo8). Article 3 of the Thresholds
Provisions provides notification to MOFCOM where the worldwide revenues of all of the
business operators to the proposed M&A exceed RMB lo billion (about $1.6 billion) with at
least two business operators achieving revenues of over RMB 400 million (about $66
million) the previous year; or the total turnover within China of all of the parties to the
M&A was at least RMB 2 billion (about $333 million) during the previous year with at least
two business operators each achieving a turnover of at least RMB 400 million (about $66
million) during the previous year.
109 See AML, art. 3(3).
110 See AML, art. 28. Note that although Article 28 refers to the State Council as the
approval authority, the State Council subsequently delegated this authority to MOFCOM.
n See id.
112 See id.
113 See AML, art. 29.
114 See MOFCOM Announcement No. 76, 2009, Notice of Anti-Monopoly Review Decision
on Conditionally Approving General Motors Corporation to Acquire Delphi Corporation
(Sept. 28, 2009) (requiring General Motors and Delphi to periodically report to MOFCOM
concerning compliance with certain conditions imposed as a prerequisite for approval of
the acquisition).
115 See MOFCOM Announcement No. 77, 2009, Notice of Anti-Monopoly Review Decision
on Conditionally Approving Pfizer Corporation to Acquire Wyeth Corporation (Sept. 29,
2009).
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business entities owned by both Wyeth and Pfizer were involved,
MOFCOM's approval was necessary before the worldwide acquisition
of Wyeth by Pfizer could be completed. A refusal by MOFCOM of the
M&A in China would probably have prevented the worldwide
acquisition, since the Chinese entities belonging to Pfizer and Wyeth
could not have been merged. MOFCOM approved the acquisition but
imposed several divestiture conditions in order to avoid the anti-
competitive effects of the transactions. MOFCOM required the
divestiture of both physical assets and non-physical assets, including
intellectual property rights.116 The divestiture of intellectual property
rights required Pfizer to sell those rights to a purchaser, which could
include a local Chinese company. MOFCOM also stated that for three
years following the divesture of some of its businesses, Pfizer was
obligated to provide "reasonable technical support"117 and "technical
training and consultation to the purchaser."" 8 Reasonable technical
support, training, and consultation to the purchaser, such as a Chinese
company, would include the provision of training involving know-
how, which might be protectable as a trade secret.119 The Pfizer
decision provides an example of how MOFCOM could require, as a
condition of approval of an M&A transaction, that the MNC provide
access to intellectual property rights by selling its rights and by
providing know-how. It is not too far of a leap to envision a case in
which MOFCOM would require that an MNC license, or even assign,
its core technologies to a Chinese entity as a condition of approval of
an M&A transaction. Suppose, for example, that an MNC sought to
acquire a Chinese company in a high technology industry. Once
acquired by the MNC, the Chinese company would be converted into a
wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE), a foreign-invested
enterprise under applicable Chinese law.12o The WFOE, although
116 See id.
"7 See id.
1s See id.
"9 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law (Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on September 2, 1993) art. lo
(defining a trade secret as "technical information and business information that is
unknown to the public, can bring economic benefits to the right owner, is of a practical
nature and is protected by confidentiality measures taken by the right owner").
120 see CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 163 (discussing how a
foreign invested enterprise is a business entity in which the foreign investor (an MNC) has
at least a twenty-five percent equity ownership. Once an MNC acquires a domestic Chinese
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wholly owned by the MNC, is treated as a Chinese business entity
formed under domestic Chinese law. It is entirely plausible that
MOFCOM would require the MNC to license its most advanced
technology to the WFOE as a condition of approval of the acquisition.
As competition law, with one exception that is not applicable in
China,121 is outside of the scope of the WTO, there would be no legal
recourse if MOFCOM refuses to approve an M&A without a
requirement that one of the parties must transfer technology as a
condition of approval.
Aside from the AML, Article 48 of the PRC Patent Law also allows
a party to apply to the Patent Authority for a compulsory license, i.e. a
license imposed upon the patent owner when the patent owner is
deemed to have committed a "monopolistic act" and the license will
mitigate the adverse impact of such act. 122 Nothing in Article 48
further defines what constitutes a "monopolistic act." Article 48
appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of TRIPS, which
does not recognize a monopolistic act as a basis for the issuance of a
company and so has 1oo percent equity ownership, the MNC will be required to convert
the domestic Chinese company into a foreign invested enterprise, such as a wholly foreign
owned subsidiary (WFOE)).
121 The Telecommunications Agreement is a specialized WTO agreement that contains
competition clauses, but this agreement applies only to those countries that sign it and is a
specialized agreement of the General Agreement on Trade in Services applicable to
countries with state owned telecommunications enterprises, which pose special
competition concerns as these companies exercise monopoly power. See CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 14, at 557.
122 Patent Law (Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth
National People's Congress on March 12, 1984; Third Amendment made According to the
Decision of the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the 1ith National People's
Congress on Revising the "Patent Law of the People's Republic of China" on 27 December
2008). Art. 48 provides in relevant part:
Under any of the following circumstances, the Patent Administration
Department under the State Council may, upon the application of any
organization or individual that possesses exploitation conditions, grant
a compulsory license for the exploitation of an invention patent or
utility model patent . . . (2) The patentee's act of exercising the patent
right is determined as monopoly in accordance with the law and the
negative impact of such an act on competition needs to be eliminated or
reduced.
compulsory license.123 As of now, no country has raised this issue
before the WTO, so Article 48 is still valid law in the PRC.
Article 350 of Section III of the PRC Contract Law created an
addition (Technology Transfer Contracts). Article 350 provides that
"[t]he transferor in a technology transfer contract shall guarantee its
legitimate ownership over the technology provided and guarantee the
technology provided to be complete, errorless, effective, and capable
of attaining the contracted goal."124 This provision could be read to
create an absolute warranty that the technology will be flawless and
must achieve a certain result; the transferor of the technology, such as
a licensor might be liable for damages if the technology fails to achieve
the expected result. Nothing like this provision exists in EU law.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EU AND
CHINA'S LAWS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
An examination and comparison of EU and China competition law
relating to technology transfers illustrate some significant differences
between the two regimes. These differences are significant and exist
even though China has intentionally sought to model its laws after
competition laws in the EU, as both China and the EU have civil law
systems. A comparison of EU and Chinese law on several important
aspects of technology transfer contracts (i.e. territorial restrictions,
grant-back clauses, and level of technology) indicates that Chinese law
is much more restrictive and protective of the recipient of technology.
Of course, competition law in the EU and China are multi-faceted and
complex, and this article focused on only three issues; many more
issues exist on both similarities and differences between the EU and
China competition law. For example, price fixing and limitations on
production, and tying obligations are prohibited under both EU 25 and
Chinese competition law.126 Both EU and Chinese competition law
123 See TRIPS, art. 31(a)-(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO,
Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) (setting forth the grounds and conditions upon which
a compulsory license can be issued).
124 See Contract Law (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's
Congress on March 15, 1999) art. 350.
125 See Commission Regulation 772/2004, supra note 72, at art. 4.1(a)-(b) (prohibiting
restrictions fixing prices or on output).
126 See AML (Adopted at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 30 August 2007) art. 13(1)-(2)
(prohibiting price fixing and limits on production); Regulations on Administrations of
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also prohibit clauses that prevent the licensee from making
improvements.12 7
Although this study has focused on only selected issues under EU
and Chinese competition law, we can draw several general conclusions
applicable to competition law generally and possibly applicable to
other areas of business law as well. First, EU law is highly technical
and extremely precise, and far exceeds Chinese competition law in
these respects. The EU starts out with a general prohibition in TFEU
Article ioi(i) against agreements with an anti-competitive object or
effect and then issues a series of block exemptions that create a safe
harbor. The EU draws technical distinctions between "competing" and
"non-competing undertakings" and between "active" and "passive"
sales in assessing territorial restrictions in technology transfer
contracts and between severable and non-severable improvements in
assessing the validity of grant-back clauses.128 The EU Commission
plays an active role in promulgating block exemptions and is
constantly studying, revising, and fine-tuning these exemptions based
upon experience.12 9 The EU Commission also plays a major role in
implementing EU law, but ultimately the duty of interpreting EU
competition law (and all EU law) is within the jurisdiction of the ECJ,
a high court that regularly issues opinions on all aspects of EU law.130
In the area of competition law, the ECJ can overrule decisions by the
EU Commission.131 Although EU competition law is highly complex, it
offers the advantages of predictably and of being a system in which
power is shared between several institutions, and is one in which the
ECJ can reign in the EU Commission when necessary in the area of
competition law.
In China, competition law is less systematically organized. While
the AML is a major piece of legislation in this area, laws that pertain to
Technology Import and Export (Promulgated by the State Council on lo December 2001
and effective as of 1 January 2002) art. 29(1) (prohibiting tying arrangements).
127 See Commission Regulation 772/2004, supra note 72, at art.4.1(d); Regulations on
Administrations of Technology Import and Export art. 29(3).
128 See Part III.C supra.
129 The EU Commission reissues revised block exemptions periodically.
130 See Part III.A supra.
'3' See, e.g., Case T-5/O2, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381 (ECJ annulling
decision by EC Commission that blocked an acquisition by Tetra Laval, a privately held
French company, of Sidel, a public corporation also with its headquarters in France).
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competition are scattered throughout China's laws and many different
authorities potentially have authority over aspects of the law. For
example, the Administration of Industry and Commerce and the
Public Security Bureau have jurisdiction to enforce competition laws
pertaining to trade secrets and trademarks.132 Courts have jurisdiction
to enforce provisions of the PRC Contract Law that pertain to
technology transfer contracts.133 Part of the explanation lies in the late
development of the AML, issued only in 2007, so it was issued on top
of an existing set of laws already dealing with certain aspects of
competition. China's laws also do not follow the model of a broad
prohibition with block exemptions; rather, the burden is upon the
MNC to read and discover all applicable laws, which include local
legislation, often controlling and very important.134 In addition, in
certain major areas of competition law, such as M&A, which
implicates technology transfer, MOFCOM is the supreme authority.13 5
While it is theoretically possible to challenge an adverse decision by
MOFCOM with the State Council, China's executive arm, no MNC
feels that this is a realistic possibility since MNCs believe that
MOFCOM might retaliate against them.136 MOFCOM plays a major
132 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law (Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on September 2, 1993) art. 3
(delegating enforcement authority to administrations of industry and commerce); art. 5
(prohibiting trademark infringements, passing off, and selling of counterfeits); art. 10
(prohibiting theft of trade secrets). The Public Security Bureau (the police) has exclusive
authority to initiate all criminal cases. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 54,
at 263. Theft of trade secrets can constitute a crime. See Criminal Law (Adopted at the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979; revised at the Fifth
Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 14, 1997) art. 219(1).
133 See Contract Law (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's
Congress on March 15, 1999) art. 128 (providing that in addition to mediation and
arbitration, parties may also bring a case in a court for disputes arising under the Contract
Law).
134 See Part III.B supra.
35 See id.
136 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 227-28. See id. According
to MOFCOM's own report, as of December 26, 2012, MOFCOM received a total of 201
M&A notifications, accepted 186 notifications, and resolved 154 notifications this year,
including 6 approved with conditions and 142 notifications approved without conditions.
Six notifications were withdrawn. No reason was given for why 15 notifications were not
accepted for filing. See
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/20131/20130108513o14.shtml.
The author has been unable to find records of any appeals of MOFCOM decisions to the
State Council.
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role not only in enforcing the AML, but in all aspects of foreign direct
investment, so MNCs must deal with MOFCOM on a regular basis.137
MOFCOM's powers are increased by what appears to be the
intentional vagueness of Chinese competition law. Key terms such as
"abuse" of intellectual property rights and "unreasonable" territorial
restraints in technology transfer agreements are left undefinedl38 and
are open to interpretations by MOFCOM.
One set of conclusions that we can reach from this comparison is
that EU law is more precise and predictable than Chinese competition
law, EU institutions have clearly defined roles, and the ECJ has a
check on the EU Commission's exercise of power. In China, laws are
less precise and scattered, and local legislation remains paramount in
many cases. MOFCOM, China's counterpart to the EU Commission in
the area of competition law, reigns supreme and, in practice, is the
final authority on competition law issues, including technology
transfer, although other entities might be involved. The
unpredictability of Chinese law and a concentration of power in one or
a few government entities increase transactions costs in China; MNCs
also feel under pressure to cultivate relationships with enforcement
authorities as these authorities have such broad discretion in business
matters, including technology transfer. Cultivating relationships,
while necessary, also brings added risks as China has a culture of both
petty and serious corruption when MNCs are forced to become
entangled with government entities in order to secure needed
approvals. These risks are high and must be taken seriously by all
MNCs doing business in China.139
Some observers argue certain features of Chinese competition law
that seem to be more protective of the recipient of the technology are
remnants of an era in which China did not trust MNCs. Only two
decades ago, as a developing country just starting on the path of
industrializing, China did not trust foreign multinationals and was
afraid that crafty and experienced business-minded foreign companies
would exploit inexperienced Chinese innocents.14o Such attitudes
might explain the requirement that the transferor of technology
provide what amounts to an absolute warranty.141 Some observers
137 See id.
38 See Part III.C supra.
139 See note 87 supra.
140 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 5, at 357.
141 See note 124, supra.
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believe that China's current technology transfer still reflect these
outdated attitudes.142 China today has the world's second largest
economy and many business persons in China are experienced and
sophisticated in dealing with western MNCs. China, however, does not
have a practice of regularly repealing laws but often adds new laws to
a layer of existing ones. This practice indicates that while
circumstances may have changed with China's economic
development, remnants of laws from an earlier era are likely to be on
China's books for the foreseeable future. These older laws create an
additional level of unpredictability.
Finally, some observers might believe that China's restrictive
technology transfer laws really are designed to force companies to set
up their own operations in China, such as a WFOE (which could
involve tens of millions of dollars of capital investment), because
transfer of advanced technology to an entity that is wholly owned by
the U.S. multinational or licensor helps to mitigate some of the risks
(such as grant-back of improvements) created by China's current
laws.143 This view is linked to China's rise as a market for global
investment and the attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign
direct investment. The argument is that as MNCs compete and clamor
for entry into the Chinese market, the Chinese government, in a
position of strength, can set high demands relating to access to
advanced technology as a price of entry into the market.
The author's own view is that seeking to avoid the pitfalls created
by restrictions in China's technology transfer laws through setting up
a wholly foreign owned enterprise to serve as the recipient of core
technology will create a host of new issues, such as theft and
misappropriation of the technology, and piracy.144 Depending upon
142 See id.
143 This observation is based upon discussions by the author with business and legal
officials of U.S. companies. There appears to be a general concern that China attempts to
use various strategies to induce or pressure U.S. companies to transfer their technologies
to China. See Daniel Chow, China's Indigenous Innovation Policies and the World Trade
Organization, 34 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing why some U.S.
companies believe that China's policies relating to government procurement are designed
to "force" U.S. companies to transfer their technology to China where it will be stolen).
144 For a discussion of counterfeiting and commercial piracy issues, one of the worst
business problems for MNCs in China, see Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of
Multinational Companies in China, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 749 (2010). The theft of trade
secrets is also a major issue in China. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Preventing Know-How
from Walking out the Door in China: Protection of Trade Secrets, 55 BUSINESS HORIZONS
329 (2012).
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the circumstances, these new concerns might be more serious than the
pitfalls that the MNC is trying to avoid. While China has vast
potential, China also offers a highly complex business, legal, and
political environment in which avoiding one set of problems might
lead to a new, even more serious, set of problems. Of course, decisions
to establish a WFOE in China or to acquire an existing Chinese
company under the AML are driven by a host of concerns that extend
beyond constraints created by China's existing technology transfer
laws. But the risks created by China's technology transfer laws, as
highlighted by a comparison to laws in the EU, and the risks created
by the need to protect intellectual property rights in general in China,
should be carefully considered and a plan should already be in place
before an MNC, or any business entity, decides to expose its
technology to the risks created by entering the China market.
